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I. Introduction
Every year sports fans in a number of cities around the United
States are faced with the prospect of their city losing one of its
professional sports franchises to relocation.1 Franchise relocation can
mean an abrupt uprooting of the deeply valued traditions for many
fans who enjoy attending games and rooting for their favorite team. It
also causes significant economic impacts on the city that loses the team.
Sports are not "only a game" to those die-hard National Football
League fans who work hard Monday through Friday so that they can
afford to root for their team on Sunday or to parents who want to
partake in the enduring tradition of bonding with their children while
enjoying a Major League Baseball game. I believe the movie
BASEketball comically captures this modem phenomenon best:
Soon it was commonplace for entire teams to change cities in
search of greater profits. The Minneapolis Lakers moved to Los
Angeles where there are no lakes. The Oilers moved to Tennessee
where there is no oil. The Jazz moved to Salt Lake City where they
don't allow music. The Raiders moved from Oakland to LA back to
Oakland. No-one in LA seemed to notice.
Though farcical, the quote describes a phenomenon that has
plagued U.S. sports, which is yearly becoming more commonplace.
For some owners this threat is merely a faqade or a tool to capitalize
on a city's dedication to their sports teams. Teams merely threaten to
leave a city in order to leverage measures for bigger, better, and more
costly stadiums for their teams.3 What has happened to the loyalty of
sports franchises to their local fan base? Is there any way for the
sports leagues to stop this trend and ensure sports fans' security
across the United States?
Over 20 years ago, the Ninth Circuit decided Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League (Raiders I),' a case
cited by many courts as the authority on sports league franchise
1. For a discussion on this trend see discussion by U.S. Senator Spector in 145
CONG. REC. S. 4665, 4673 (1999).
2. BASEKETBALL (MCA/Universal Pictures 1998).
3. 145 Cong. Rec. S. at 4673 (1999). See also Brower v. State, 969 P.2d 42, 46 (1998)
(affirming summary judgment dismissing taxpayer challenges to the validity of emergency
legislation for new stadium passed in face of threat by Seattle Seahawks owner that the
franchise would move to California if legislation did not pass); Sports Franchise
Movement: Hearing on H.R. 2740 and H.R. 2699 Before the House Comm. On the
Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 104-656, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter Sports Franchise Movement
Hearings] (testimony of NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue); Id. (testimony of Professor
Andrew Zimbalist).
4. Los Angeles M~m'l Coliseum v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Raiders 1].
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relocation.5 The court held that the National Football League's (NFL)
restriction on franchise relocation was illegal under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and, in a later case, awarded damages to the Raiders
and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum for this violation.6
In part A of section II, this note provides a general overview of
antitrust law. In part B of section II, this note explores how antitrust
law applies to sports leagues and reviews the Ninth Circuit's analysis
in Raiders I.
Section III considers the Raiders I decision in light of two
developments in antitrust law that arose since the decision in Raiders
L' First, it looks at how changes in other areas of antitrust law could
apply to the sports league context. Second, it explores how these
changes could affect how a similar sports league franchise relocation
antitrust case would be decided today. Overall, these modern
developments seem to weigh in favor of sports leagues regulating
their franchise's ability to relocate, which benefits sports fans seeking
stability and continuity in modern sports programs.
II. Legal Overview and History
A. Antitrust Law Historical Approach and Analysis Overview
1. Antitrust Law Overview
The Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in 1890 as the
federal government's uniform response to monopolization and cartel
behavior that restrained trade in the United States.8 Sherman Act
section 1 made illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations." 9 Section 2 of the
act makes actual or attempted monopolization illegal." This paper
will focus on section 1 conduct as it relates to professional sports
leagues.
5. Travis Tygart, Antitrust's Impact on the National Football League and Team
Relocation, 7 SPORTS L.J. 29, 31 (2000); John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of
Owners, Cities, Leagues and Congress, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 83 (1994).
6. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1386-87; Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum v. NFL, 791 F.2d
1356, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Raiders III.
7. See infra section III.B.
8. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2005); see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 1-15 (2d ed. 2001).
9. 15 U.S.C. §1.
10. 15 U.S.C. §2.
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The two main types of collusive restraints that are potentially
illegal under section 1 are horizontal restraints and vertical
restraints.Y Horizontal restraints are agreements and collaborations
between market competitors.12 Vertical restraints involve firms at
different levels of the production/distribution chain, for example, an
agreement between a manufacturer and its distributors. 3 Thus, in the
context of a sports league, a horizontal restraint would occur when
teams made agreements that restrained trade, whereas a vertical
restraint would occur when the league collaborated with a team or
multiple teams to restrain trade (in the example above, the league
would be the manufacturer and the teams the distributors). The first
step in an antitrust case is for the plaintiff to prove the nature of the
defendant's alleged illegal restraint and its anti-competitive impact.
2. Per Se versus Rule of Reason Analysis
Some trade restraints are so highly offensive that they are
considered illegal per se, meaning the "mere existence of the restraint
is illegal.' 4 Others are less clear and require courts to use a test called
the rule of reason to determine whether "the restraint's harm to
competition outweighs its pro-competitive effects."' 5 Under the rule
of reason, a court's determination of unreasonableness "may be based
either 1) on the nature or character of the contracts, or 2) on
surrounding circumstances giving rise to the interference or
presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance
prices.' 6 The Supreme Court has held that the nature of sports
leagues, and namely the fact that some horizontal constraints are
necessary to preserve league integrity and competitive balance,
necessitates using the rule of reason analysis as opposed to per se
illegality. 7
Under the rule of reason approach, the plaintiff in the antitrust
suit must first show an anti-competitive impact on a competitive
11. POSNER, supra note 8, at 1-15.
12. Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application, Vol. 7, para. 1437 (2005).
13. Id.
14. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA].
15. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)).
17. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01; See also Raiders 1, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387; Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc. 815 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1987)
[hereinafter SDC].
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market (the horizontal or vertical restraint discussed above).'8 This
can either happen under the "quick look" approach, where an anti-
competitive impact is inferred by virtue of higher prices and lower
output, or the court can fully examine the relevant product and
geographic markets and establish that the defendant has market
power in the relevant markets.' 9 This analysis, along with the court's
analysis in deciding whether to implement the "quick look" approach,
is explained in greater detail in the context of franchise relocation
below.20
3. Relevant Product and Geographic Market Determinations
All parties in the antitrust suit are given a chance to define the
relevant market. Understanding the overall relevant market allows
the court to determine the defendant's market power and evaluate
the alleged competitive restraint on trade. Also, whether the restraint
is reasonable or not often depends on how the relevant product and
geographic markets are defined. In many cases, this definition is key
to understanding whether there has been an antitrust violation.2'
Defining the product market requires each party to offer their
own "process of describing those groups of producers which, because
of the similarity of their products, have the ability-actual or
potential-to take significant amounts of business away from each
other. 22 Previously, cases have not used a set uniform method as to
how to come up with that evidence.23 Past sports franchise relocation
cases, for instance, have used concepts such as "reasonable
interchangeability" of other products in the market and "cross
elasticity of demand between the product itself and the substitutes for
it.''24 This analysis does not provide the court with an exact
methodology to come up with a relevant market.
25
Defendants in antitrust litigation will always try to define the
product markets as broadly as possible. The broader the definition,
the less the defendant's market power and the more minuscule
defendant's restraint on trade appears to be in consideration of the
18. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
19. Id. at 109.
20. See discussion infra section II.B.2.b, III.B.1.
21. Wunderli, supra note 5; Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market
Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
22. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1392.
23. See infra discussion of SSNIP test in section III.B.2.
24. See Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1393; Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1961).
25. See discussion infra section II.B.2.b, III.B.1.
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market as a whole.26 In contrast, plaintiffs will always try to define the
relevant product market as narrowly as possible, in order to amplify
the actions of the defendant and exaggerate its anti-competitive
effects.27 The same game is played with the geographic market. The
geographic market is the area in which the seller conducts business
and the buyer can turn for supplies or substitutes. 28 The defendant in
antitrust litigation will likely define the geographic market as broadly
as possible. The plaintiff will do the opposite.29 Once a relevant
market is established and the plaintiff has proven that the defendant's
actions had a significant anti-competitive impact on the relevant
market (unless the "quick look" approach is applied, which relieved
the plaintiff of its burden), the burden shifts to the defendant to show
pro-competitive justifications for its actions.3° Then, if the defendant
convinces the court that pro-competitive justifications outweigh its
anti-competitive impacts, the plaintiff can still discredit the
defendant's actions by showing that the defendant did not implement
the least restrictive means (on trade) in achieving its pro-competitive
goal.31
4. Ramifications of Finding a Sherman Act Violation
The significant power of antitrust litigation is contained in two
words: treble damages.32 If in the court finds a violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, the defendant faces the prospect of threefold
damages.33 For an example of this effect on sports leagues, even the
mere threat of treble damages has caused sports leagues to change
their rules in fear of antitrust liability. These leagues would rather not
take a chance on slightly anti-competitive rules that could greatly
benefit their sports in order to avoid the prospect of treble damages.
34
In turn, this affects a sports league's control over the relocation of its
26. See, e.g., Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1392-93.
27. See, e.g., id.
28. Tampa Electric Coal v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
29. See, e.g., id.
30. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 112.
31. Id. at 112 ("arguably tailored to serve such an interest").
32. Sports Franchise Movement Hearings, supra note 3 (testimony of NFL
Commissioner Paul Taglibue).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League,
726 F.2d 1381, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984)
34. Sports Franchise Movement Hearings, supra note 3 (testimony of NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue); see also Tygart, supra note 5, at 55 ("The mere threat of
an antitrust lawsuit in response to the NFL challenging a team's relocation is equivalent to
using a 'nuclear weapon."').
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member teams to be faced with even the mere threat of antitrust
litigation.35 Thus, the result is that leagues are afraid to stand up
against teams seeking relocation, to the detriment of local fans and
cities.3"
B. Sports Antitrust and Franchise Relocation Cases
1. History of Anti-Trust Application to Professional Sports
The Supreme Court first looked at the Sherman Act in the
context of professional sports in Federal Baseball Clubs, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.37 The Court relied on
scope limitations of the Sherman Act to hold that Major League
Baseball (MLB) was not subject to the Sherman Act because the
league's activities did not constitute "interstate commerce" and thus
were not within Congress's discretion to regulate.38 Since then, the
Supreme Court has upheld this antitrust exemption for the MLB
despite the fact that its trade would most definitely constitute
"interstate commerce" in even the strictest definition of the term
today.39 Besides the Curt Flood Act,' which recently lifted the
antitrust exemption for Baseball (but only in the area employment
issues), Congress has yet to further to restrict this exemption."4 1
35. Sports Franchise Movement Hearings, supra note 3 (testimony of NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue).
36. Daniel S. York, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act: Congress'
Best Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 345, 351 (1987); Professional Sports
Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 77 (1985)
(testimony of David J. Stern, Commissioner, NBA); see also S. REP. NO. 99-69, at 3
(1985).
37. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
38. Id. at 208-09; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, (1953) (despite finding that
baseball is most likely engaged in interstate commerce, court is reluctant to overturn
Federal Baseball especially since Congress has not acted on the issue); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, (1972) (stating "baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce"
and the court admits that, if not for strict adherence to stare decisis, the MLB would not be
exempt from antitrust scrutiny).
40. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2005) (originally codified at 15 U.S.C. §
27a).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (stating "No court shall rely on the enactment of this
section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a)); see also Matthew
Ryan McCarthy, Sports: Revenue Sharing in Major League Baseball: Are Cuba's Political
Managers on Their Way Over Too?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 555 (2005).
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As stated in Flood v. Kuhn, the MLB's exemption is "an
exception and an anomaly," one that is not enjoyed by the other
professional sports. In Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445 (1957), the NFL argued that it too deserved an exemption
equal to that of the MLB in Federal Baseball because of its similar
status as a sports league.43 The Court rejected the NFL's argument. 4
The Court went on to fully limit the scope of Federal Baseball to the
"business of organized professional baseball," refusing to extend the
exemption by analogy to the NFL or any other sport that sought it.
45
This idea of applying the Sherman Act to other professional sports
(besides the MLB) has been generally affirmed ever since. 6
2. Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Rules and Raiders I
Raiders I is cited by many as the forefront case in matters of
sports teams franchise relocation. 7 In Raiders I, the Ninth Circuit
held that sports leagues (besides the MLB) are subject to antitrust
rules when trying to restrict the relocation of their sports franchises.48
I believe, however, as will be discussed below, the general feeling that
Raiders I permanently resolved the issue of sports leagues regulation
of franchise relocation is overstated when considering all of the
changes in antitrust law over the last 20 years.
a. Overview of the Findings in Raiders I
In Raiders I, the Ninth Circuit found that the NFL had violated
section I of the Sherman Act by restricting a team's ability to relocate
within the home market of another team.49 In 1980, Al Davis, the
owner of the Oakland Raiders, agreed with the Los Angeles.
Memorial Coliseum to move the Raiders to Los Angeles. ° The NFL
initially objected to the move because it would cut in on the Rams of
Anaheim's established market. 1 The NFL, after revising its relocation
rule, primarily based its rejection of the relocation on principles of
42. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
43. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450 (1957).
44. Id. at 450-51.
45. Id. at 451; see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 278-79.
46. See Flood, 407 U.S. 258; Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d
378 (1983) (court found that the NFL is engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the
antitrust laws); Raiders , 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
47. See Tygart, supra note 5; See also Wunderli, supra note 5.
48. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1385-87.
49. Id. at 1395.
50. Id. at 1384-85.
51. Id.
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league control over the location of its franchises.52 Just prior to the
case, Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution stated:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of
football games by member clubs within the home territory of each
member. No member club shall have the right to transfer its
franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or outside
its home territory, without prior approval by the affirmative vote of
three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the League.
53
Rule 4.3 also instructed that, in order to defeat the relocation of
one of its member teams, three-fourths of the team owners would
have to vote against the trade. 4 The three-fourths margin was easily
met to defeat the Raiders' move.55 The Raiders and the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum then brought suit against the NFL for antitrust
violations in regards to Rule 4.3.56
b. Rule of Reason Analysis in Raiders I
The Ninth Circuit and the district court claimed to have done a
full rule of reason test of the relevant product market as opposed to
the "quick look" approach. 7 This means that the plaintiff had the
burden of proving that Rule 4.3 had an actual anti-competitive
effect.58 If the court had taken a quick look approach, on the other
hand, the plaintiff would have been relieved of its burden to prove
this anti-competitive harm.
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the district court, however, did the
full in depth rule of reason analysis that would be required in a
modern antitrust case after California Dental Association v. FTC
(CDA). 9 Holding that the plaintiffs had proven one of the elements
of their burden, the Ninth Circuit simply stated, "Rule 4.3 is on its
face an agreement to control, if not prevent, competition among the
52. The NFL's original constitution included a restriction on another team entering a
home territory (75 mile radius around any existing team), but this restriction was omitted
due to other pending litigation by the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. Despite the
change, however, the Ninth Circuit still treated Rule 4.3 as an "exclusive territory" market
division arrangement, which aided in its finding of antitrust violations. This is discussed
below at II.B.2.b.
53. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1385.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1385.
57. Id. at 1391.
58. Id.
59. 526 U.S. 756 (1999) [hereinafter CDA]; See infra section III.B.1 for discussion on
CDA's impact on modern antitrust analysis.
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NFL teams through territorial divisions." 6 The court not only
overstates the scope of the rule, but it also relies on the presumption
that Rule 4.3 is clearly anti-competitive "on its face., 61 In doing so,
the court actually excused the plaintiffs of their burden to prove the
anti-competitive effects despite the court's claim that this assumption,
in and of itself, was "evidence" enough to meet the burden.6 While
this approach might have been satisfactory for its time, this
assumption would not pass muster in a modern antitrust case since
the Supreme Court's decision in CDA.63
c. Relevant Market Definition in Raiders I
Raiders I presented a basic inquiry into the relevant markets.
There was no in-depth market analysis and it was conducted by each
party with general notions of interchangeability (or lack there of).64
The NFL attempted to define the product market as
entertainment in general (including college football, other sports, and
other types of entertainment outside the sports realm) and the
relevant geographic market as the entire United States.6 Thus, the
NFL submitted a very large relevant market. The Raiders, on the
other hand, defined the product market as NFL football and accepted
no reasonable consumer substitutes for the NFL product.' The
Raiders also submitted a narrower definition of the geographic
market-Southern California as opposed to the entire United States.67
The Los Angles Memorial Coliseum (a plaintiff along with the
Raiders) defined the product market as all stadiums competing for
NFL teams.6 The district court allowed the jury to decide which
definition to follow. In the end, it chose the Raiders' narrow
definition.69
60. Raiders !, 726 F.2d at 1391.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1392 (The court finds that "[o]n its face, Rule 4.3 divides markets among
the 28 teams" and therefore was anti-competitive).
63. See infra section III.B.1.
64. 726 F.2d at 1392. There was an issue about stipulation to the testimony of non-
experts, but the Ninth Circuit finds that the laymen testimony was adequate to establish a
market, though there is not much discussion of defining the relevant market.
65. Id. at 1393.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The product market definition and the Ninth Circuit's reaction to it are
discussed in section III.B.2.c infra.
69. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1393-96.
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With the definition of the market so restricted, the NFL had little
wiggle room; its market power was huge and any slight restraint on
trade was magnified. Considering that the definition of the relevant
market can make or break the case, this narrow definition of the
product market was so unfavorable to the NFL that it proved a hurdle
too formidable for the NFL to overcome. ° It was likely because of
this market definition that the NFL lost its case.7
Il. Shifting Focus to Developments in Modern Antitrust Law
A. Not Just Sports Law, Antitrust Law
Before addressing the modern trends of antitrust law since
Raiders I, I would like to clear up what I believe to be an inaccurate
distinction between antitrust issues and sports law cases. Some law
review articles and court decisions consider sports antitrust law as a
different breed of antitrust law with its own set of precedent.72
General precedents of emerging antitrust law are too often ignored or
simply distinguished. However, there is no indication in the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, or any of the supporting legislative materials
that Congress intended to treat antitrust in the context of professional
sports differently than general antitrust doctrine.73
The very nature of sports leagues and the competition that they
promote amongst their teams presents a more extensive rule of
reason analysis when compared to other markets. However, the way
in which sports league antitrust issues are analyzed should not differ
from the conventional structure of antitrust analysis. Modern
Supreme Court antitrust rulings should drive the analysis of sports
league relocation rules and, within this framework, take into account
the nuances and special needs of sports leagues in weighing pro-
competitive justifications and anti-competitive results. Applying the
modern rulings more accurately indicates the antitrust implications of
sports league franchise relocation restrictions in future cases. This
70. Wunderli, supra note 5, at 103; Harris & Jorde, supra note 21, at 5.
71. Wunderli, supra note 5, at 103. ("the consequence of this market definition is that
the NFL loses").
72. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, Note: Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and Franchise
Relocation: Can a Team Move? 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1201 (1999); Tygart, supra note 5;
Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1385-93; SDC, 815 F.2d 562; But see Scott Hale, Jerry Jones Versus
The NFL: An Opportunity To Apply Logically The Single Entity Defense To The NFL, 4
SPORTS L.J. 1, 7 (Spring 1997) ("Although Copperweld did not involve sports, the Court
set out the general policies underlying Section 1..." which the author explains could apply
to sports league antitrust cases).
73. With the exclusion of Major League Baseball.
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approach would link "sports antitrust law" to modern antitrust
analysis.
While Raiders I may have been consistent with the antitrust
analysis standards circa 1984, it is not fully consistent with the analysis
in current controlling antitrust precedent. 4 Raiders I, as precedent, is
only as strong as its underlying analysis. If the underlying analysis is
plainly wrong or insufficient in light of more recent and inconsistent
Supreme Court rulings, the case's value, as precedent, is weakened.
The case need not be overruled entirely to lose its value as precedent.
The Supreme Court does not have to grant certiorari to a sports
franchise relocation case to settle the rules in this area of law. It is
legitimate to use the court's modern rulings in other areas of antitrust
law to reshape our understanding of Raiders I. For this reason,
Raiders I should not be followed blindly today, without considering
the changes in antitrust law discussed below. These changes could
lead to a different outcome in sports league franchise relocation cases
today.
B. Developments in Antitrust Law Since Raiders I
Significant developments in antitrust law have occurred since
Raiders I was decided in 1984. Those developments should be
incorporated into any future sports league relocation case.
First, the Supreme Court has recognized that a modern antitrust
case can be complex and may deserve a more extensive market
analysis by the plaintiff (to show an anti-competitive effect due to the
defendant's action) than what is afforded by the "quick look"
approach. In CDA, the Supreme Court further narrowed the
application of the "quick look" approach to cases where the
defendant's actions have a clear cut anti-competitive impact.75 In
doing so, the Court restored emphasis to the plaintiff's initial burden
of proving the anti-competitive impact of the defendant's actions
while also considering the pro-competitive justifications before
putting the alleged antitrust violator on the defensive.
Second, another theory of defining the relevant product and
geographic market has emerged since the decision in Raiders L As
discussed later, the "Small but Significant and Non-transitory
Increase in Price" test (SSNIP) applies a more detailed methodology
for establishing the relevant market, requiring a more in-depth
analysis.
74. See infra section II.B.
75. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC. 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
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1. In Depth Rule of Reason Approach Provided by CDA
a. Abbreviated Analysis and Burden Shifting in Raiders I
In Raiders I, the Ninth Circuit claimed that its analysis was a full
rule of reason analysis, with no mention of the "quick look"
approach.76 The court stated that the burden did in fact rest on the
plaintiff to show: "(1) An agreement among two or more persons or
distinct business entities; (2) Which is intended to harm or
unreasonably restrain competition; (3) And which actually causes
injury to competition.""
The court stated that the plaintiff met the first prong in showing
the nature of the agreement between the 28 NFL teams (and the
court's rejection of the NFL's single entity defense). The court merely
assumes, however, that the second prong was obvious by the nature
of the agreement.78 The third prong, the court admitted, was "more
troublesome," yet the court never stated whether or not the plaintiff
affirmatively met its burden in proving an actual injury to competition
before shifting the burden to the defendant to justify its actions. 9 The
court discussed the validity of the NFL's defense to that inquiry as
being insufficient to rebut the plaintiff's anti-competitive allegations,
but not affirmative proof that there was an anti-competitive impact in
the first place. ° With the second prong assumed by the court and the
third prong of the plaintiff's burden essentially shifted to the
defendant to disprove, the court did not strictly enforce the plaintiff's
initial burden.
This analysis cannot legitimately be considered a burden on the
plaintiff. The court seems to have in fact conducted a "quick look,"
excusing the initial burden on the plaintiff and jumping directly into a
balancing of the pro-competitive justifications with anti-competitive
harms under the remaining rule of reason analysis. 8 Despite the fact
that the court claims to have done a full and in-depth rule of reason
inquiry with the initial burden on the plaintiff, the analysis (or lack
there of) speaks for itself.
76. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1391
77. Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980)).
78. Id. ("Rule 4.3 is on its face an agreement to control, if not prevent, competition
among the NFL teams through territorial divisions")
79. Id. at 1391, 1395.
80. Id.
81. See CDA, 526 U.S. at 770.
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b. "Quick Look" Approach Before CDA
The "quick look" approach is not a fatal flaw in antitrust cases. It
was used in other antitrust cases prior to 1984 and could have been
justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma (NCAA). 2
In NCAA, the Court found that a "naked restraint on price and
output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of
a detailed market analysis." 83 Thus, in "quick look" cases, an initial
"detailed market analysis" by the plaintiff to show anti-competitive
effects of the defendant's actions was not required in order to start
scrutinizing the defendant's pro-competitive justifications to the anti-
competitive allegations.'
In NCAA, the NCAA's rules limited universities' ability to
contract television broadcasts in an effort to give everyone a chance
to contract for such broadcasts.85 The Supreme Court found this to be
"naked restraint on price and output 8 6 and thus, quite clearly anti-
competitive, justifying a "quick look" without a burden on the
plaintiff to prove an anti-competitive effect.'
However, even under NCAA, it was not so clear in Raiders I that
a sports league restraining a team's ability to relocate was a "naked
restraint on price and output," thus justifying a relief of the plaintiff's
burden.0 The "abbreviated analysis" used in Raiders I becomes even
more suspect after CDA.89
c. Rejection of "Quick Look" Approach in CDA
In CDA, the Supreme Court clarified when a "quick look"
approach is appropriate and when a full market analysis is necessary.'
The case involved the California Dental Association's advertising
restrictions on its member dentists.1 The CDA restricted dentists
from advertising their quality of care and price discounts.9 2 The Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's use of the "quick look" approach in CDA




86. Id. at 110
87. Id. at 100-105.
88. See Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1391; see also infra III.B.1.d.-e.
89. CDA, 526 U.S. at 769, 770.
90. Id. at 777-78.
91. Id. at 759.
92. Id. at 759-60.
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because it was not clearly a constraint effecting output or price.93 In
fact, the Court found that the "CDA's advertising restrictions might
plausibly be thought to have a net pro-competitive effect, or possibly
no effect at all on competition."94 The Court remanded for "fuller
consideration" because "the Court of Appeals did not scrutinize the
assumption of the relative anti-competitive tendencies." 95 The Court
especially focused on the purpose behind the rules, consumer
protection, and found that consumer protection alone was possibly
enough to validate any alleged anti-competitive results.96 CDA
teaches us that even if the court initially assumes conduct to be anti-
competitive, this still warrants a deeper probe by the court into the
anti-competitive effects and provides no relief of the plaintiff's
burden.97
The overall effect of CDA was to greatly limit the applicability of
the "quick look" approach in antitrust cases. 9 Essentially, without
overruling NCAA, the Supreme Court in CDA found that the "quick
look approach carries the day [only] when the great likelihood of
anti-competitive effects can easily be ascertained. '" 99 Given that this
case did not provide a classic anti-competitive scenario where the
defendant was limiting price or output to the detriment of the
consumer, the "quick look" approach was not appropriate.1" The
Court also held that, in these types of cases, a court should look at the
pro-competitive effects of the restraints, without shifting the burden
to the defendant.'' Thus, the plaintiff's initial burden remains.'°2
93. Id. at 771.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 781.
96. Id. at 772 ("difficulty for customers or potential competitors to get and verify
information").
97. Id. at 760.
98. Melissa Pientka, Antitrust Violations, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267, 275 (Spring
2004) ("It has been argued that the Court's ruling in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC
constitutes a 'set back' for the quick look movement and may narrow the application of
this doctrine in future cases.").
99. CDA, 526 U.S. at 770.
100. Id. at 769-70.
101. Id. at 775 n.12 ("before a theoretical claim of anti-competitive effects can justify
shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of pro-competitive effects,
as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there must be some indication that the court
making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for the anti-competitive
effects and considered whether the effects actually are anti-competitive"); see also
Pientka, supra note 98, at 311 n.39.
102. CDA, 526 U.S. at 775.
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d. Applying CDA to Raiders I and Sports Franchise Relocation
Applying CDA's theories to the facts in Raiders I changes the
analysis. Restricting franchise relocation is not, in and of itself, meant
to be a restriction on price or output to the consumer, and thus
deserves a full market analysis with the burden of proving anti-
competitive effects resting squarely on the plaintiff. It seems clear
that CDA would require a court to do a more extensive analysis with
the burden of in-depth anti-competitive proof put on the plaintiff
than was performed in Raiders L CDA puts the teeth back into the
plaintiff's initial burden, by not requiring the sports league to be
immediately on the defensive concerning its relocation rule. CDA
also requires the pro-competitive justifications to be examined during
the period of the plaintiff's initial burden, making it a higher bar for
the plaintiff to overcome.
CDA states that "quick-look analysis carries the day when the
great likelihood of anti-competitive effects can easily be
ascertained." °3 The fact that the Raiders I court admitted that proving
actual anti-competitive harm was "more troublesome" favors the use
of a full in-depth market analysis with the burden on the plaintiff. As
stated in CDA, it takes an "obvious anti-competitive effect [in order
to] trigger abbreviated analysis."'" This obviousness was not present
in Raiders I.
It seems, using CDA as a model, if Raiders I came to the Ninth
Circuit today (with the same analysis), it should be remanded for
further in-depth market analysis by the plaintiffs to prove the anti-
competitive harm. Under CDA, a court in the same situation could
not assume that the plaintiff met its burden as a matter of law. The
plaintiff would have to come up with "empirical evidence" of the anti-
competitive effects of the NFL's relocation restrictions without the
court aiding the plaintiff with its assumptions. 5 In CDA, the Court
showed an aversion to the types of assumptions rampant in Raiders
. 6 Thus, the restoration of this full initial burden on any plaintiff
challenging a sports league's relocation restrictions would be greatly
beneficial to that sports league's case.
In similar vein, under CDA, a court should consider the pro-
competitive justifications presented by the sports league without
103. Id. at 770.
104. Id. at 778.
105. Seeid. at 775 n.1 2
106. See id. ("Where, as here, the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat
complex, assumption alone will not do.").
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shifting the burden to the defendant. 7 In Raiders I, the third prong of
the plaintiff's initial burden, in reality, was shifted to the defendant.
CDA clearly reinforces the plaintiff's burden and also forces the court
to initially factor in the defendant's pro-competitive justifications,
making the plaintiff's burden heavier to carry."
e. Ultimate Benefit to the Consumer in CDA
CDA also teaches another justification that the NFL should be
more mindful of in the future, something that Ninth Circuit even
pointed out in Raiders I and current NFL by-laws stress." In CDA,
the court points out that the advertising restrictions were meant to
benefit the consumer and could even have a net pro-competitive
effect because they were meant to protect consumers from potentially
deceptive advertising.
In Raiders I, the NFL seemed too focused on the effect of
competition between teams in the same market because of the
relocation."' This type of market division can even be considered
illegal per se under certain contexts if prices are raised as a result of
the division."' 2 The NFL changed its by-laws prior to the case to avoid
market division scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless still fixated
on the NFL's market division as its reason for Rule 4.3's existence as
opposed to general matters of league control."3 The court did not
focus enough on the potential harm that team relocations could have
on the fans, who are the ultimate consumers. The Supreme Court's
analysis in CDA suggests that a benefit to consumers in the form of
valid consumer protection is an important consideration, especially
since" the Sherman Act was intended to benefit consumers in the first
place."' In CDA, the Court seems to emphasize that the reason
behind the restraint was not to economically benefit the defendant,
107. See id.
108. See supra section III.B.l.a.
109. See CDA, 526 U.S. at 770-75.
110. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1397; Sanjay Jose Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise
Free Agency and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 9 (Fall 1996).
111. Either it was the NFL actually focusing on this justification or it was the court's
focal point because of the previously implemented Rule 4.3. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1392.
112. See United States v. Topco Associates Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Palmer v. BRG
of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
113. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1392 ("On its face, Rule 4.3 divides markets among the 28
teams....").




but rather to benefit the consumer."5 Following the same line of
reasoning, a sports league should stress that its restraint on franchise
relocations is not aimed at putting money into its own pocket,116 but is
aimed at making a better product and pleasing fans.
There is evidence that the NFL has adhered to this fan-friendly
justification in its modern restrictions on relocations."7 Perhaps a
sports league in a future antitrust case dealing with a rule that is
completely divorced from the market division concerns and truly aims
to benefit consumers could rely on CDA to show an overall pro-
competitive effect (through consumer protection) of that rule during
the plaintiff's initial burden phase.
2. The SSNIP Test and Its Application in Modern Antitrust Law
a. Origin and Application of the SSNIP test
In 1992, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a revised
version of its horizontal merger guidelines (DOJ Guidelines)." The
purposes of the DOJ Guidelines are to make transparent the
procedure by which the DOJ evaluates mergers for antitrust issues,
and to provide more detailed guidelines for its own implementation.
Among other things, the guidelines provide a more technical way to
analyze the relevant market. Specifically, they stress the
interchangeability of substitute products that fit into the same market
as the product in question. 9
Under the DOJ Guidelines approach, the first step in defining
the product market is to take the product at issue (a widget, for
example) and assume a hypothetical single seller makes all safes of
the product. The second step assumes that this seller implements a
hypothetical "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in
price (SSNIP) to that product. The rule of thumb is that a 5%
increase in price usually qualifies as a SSNIP, but this can vary
depending on the market at issue (it seems to be up to the DOJ's
115. CDA, 526 U.S. at 775 (the rule at issue was an ethics rule made to benefit the
consumer and its member dentists in the long term).
116. Fixating on the market division aspect, however, might defeat this argument
because it is something that benefits other owners in the league.
117. Mullick, supra note 110, at 9.
118. U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992 as amended
1997) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
119. Id. at §1.1.
120. Id.
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discretion).'21 Essentially, if enough buyers would buy substitute
products to make the price increase unprofitable for the hypothetical
seller, then any product that buyers would substitute for the widget
when faced with a SSNIP would be considered within the relevant
product market of widgets.'22 For example, if a SSNIP imposed on
buyers of beef would result in enough consumers switching to pork to
make the beef SNIP unprofitable, pork and beef would be in the
same product market.
In order to gauge the hypothetical buyers' reactions to this price
increase, the DOJ Guidelines suggest that certain evidence should be
taken into account. An evaluator must consider: (1) whether the
buyers in the past "have shifted or have considered shifting" to other
products in response to price changes;'" (2) whether sellers base their
"business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution between
products in response to relative changes in price;"'24 (3) the "influence
of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output
markets;"' 25 and (4) "the timing and costs of switching products.' '12 6
Because of the hypothetical nature of the inquiry, these factors are
hugely important in determining the results of the SSNIP test.
2 7
Using the SSNIP test, a court trying to gauge the product market
is forced to do a fairly extensive inquiry into how this hypothetical
price increase would affect the product market. It is forced to
consider all alternatives and realistically estimate how the consumer
would react to the increase in price.
The SSNIP test is also used to test the relevant geographic
market.1 28 If, upon implementation of a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price, consumers would switch to outside
locations for substitutions to the product with a SSNIP, then these








127. John D. Harkrider, Operationalizing The Hypothetical Monopolist Test,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/docs/202598.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
128. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 118, §1.2.
129. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 118, §1.2.
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b. Use of the SSNIP Test in United States v. Microsoft130
In United States v. Microsoft Corporation, the D.C. Circuit used
the SSNIP test to evaluate the relative product market of Microsoft
Windows."' The United States argued, and the district court agreed,
that the product market could not include Mac OS because
"consumers would not switch from Windows to Mac OS in response
to a substantial price increase" because of new hardware costs.
13
Thus, the court relied on the excessive "costs of switching products"
factor listed in the DOJ Guidelines in order to discount Microsoft's
expanded product market definition.'33 The Microsoft court's analysis
also endorsed the necessity of an extensive inquiry into the question
of the product market."3
The SSNIP test is the centerpiece of product market definitions
in many types of modern antitrust cases. "5 This has translated into a
much more in-depth product market analysis by economic experts on
the basis of the SSNIP test than occurred in Raiders I." As the next
discussion will uncover, the analysis portrayed in Raiders I is no
longer considered to be up to modern day standards in antitrust law
simply because the SSNIP was not implemented.
c. Using the SSNIP Test in Raiders I and Other Relocation Cases
In Raiders I, the jury found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that
"NFL Football" was the product market.3 7 The court did not go into
any analysis as to how the district court arrived at this narrow
130. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id.
133. Id.; DOJ Guidelines, supra note 118, §1.1.
134. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52.
135. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Multinational Antitrust: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,
102 MICH. L. REV. 988, 999 (2004) (Reviewing Ky P. Ewing's Competition Rules for the
21" Century); Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust
Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999); Peter Davis, The
Effect Of Local Competition On Admission Prices In The U.S. Motion Picture Exhibition
Market 48 J. L. & ECON. 677, 678 (2005); ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 455 (2002).
136. See Calder et. al, Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review: Supplement to the
2003 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review Proceedings: Committee on Antitrust &
Trade Regulation: Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 379,
448 (2004) (Sophistication in antitrust cases economic and market analysis has gone up
significantly since the mid-1980s); See also Harris & Jorde, supra note 21, at 5.
137. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1394.
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definition or why the Ninth Circuit accepted this definition. 138 There
are many unresolved questions with such a general definition of the
product market. The district court, with the Ninth Circuit affirming,
seems to have approached the question in the wrong way.
Who are the customers of "NFL Football?" There are clearly
different markets in which the NFL competes for business.139 In a
modern day analysis using the SSNIP test, those markets would be
separated and analyzed individually, otherwise the application of the
SSNIP test would make no sense. In order to accurately gauge the
product market, the court must take into account other competitors
in those markets and whether a SSNIP would induce consumers in
those markets to switch products. A fuller market analysis begins with
an in-depth breakdown of the actual market and what is being sold.
This breakdown analysis is not a new phenomenon. In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court favored the district
court's breakdown of the shoe market into women's shoes, men's
shoes, and children's shoes, because these narrow sub-markets better
identified the competition for antitrust purposes.'9 In breaking down
a product market into its appropriate sub-markets for a more in-
depth analysis, the Court gave some guidance:
[t]he boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by
examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of
the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct141 prices, sensitivity to price changes, and
specialized vendors.
Many other courts have followed the Brown Shoe sub-market
model for determining the relevant product market.'42
Using these guidelines, the NFL product can be broken down
into other sub-markets such as advertising and sponsorships, live
attendance ticket sales, television contracts, NFL merchandise,
championship games as distinguishable from regular season games,
and so on. Once you have the sub-markets, the SSNIP test makes
138. Besides stating that there is no substitute for NFL football and that the jury's
findings were reasonable, we are given nothing as technical as a SSNIP analysis to
investigate why these findings were reasonable.
139. For example: advertising, fans for live attendance, sponsorships, NFL
merchandise, championship games as distinguishable from regular season games, etc.
140. 370 U.S. 294 at 325 (1962) (involving a challenge to a merger as potentially illegal
under §7 of the Clayton Act).
141. Id.
142. See Debra M. Levitt, Examining Exclusionary Conduct of HMOs and PPOs: A
Case Comment on Northwest Medical Laboratories v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Oregon, 17 AM. J. L. AND MED. 271, 279 (1991).
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more sense and is easier to apply. For example, the customer base
targeted by the NFL for advertising and sponsorship deals is likely
different from the customer base targeted by live attendance ticket
sales. While a SSNIP in ticket sales may not deter some sports fans
from attending the games,"' a SSNIP in advertising prices may deter
an advertiser with a bottom line who is only trying to reach a certain
demographic. The customer/advertisee, when presented with a
SSNIP, might determine its ability to reach the same number of
individuals within that demographic to be below the increase in price
through alternative means. The viable alternatives to a SSNIP in this
sub-market could range from sports teams in other leagues to other
types of entertainment such as television advertising during other
sports events or different types of shows.
In International Boxing Club v. United States, the court
recognized championship boxing matches as a distinct market from
regular boxing matches.'" Similarly, in a relocation case, Piazza v.
Major League Baseball,' the district court defined the relevant
market as the "sports franchise market" because the facts of the case
involved the potential sale of sports franchise.' 6
While Raiders I did discuss the stadium leasing market in
determining the relevant product market, it did not come close to the
in-depth analysis a SSNIP test would provide. During the district
court trial, Los Angeles. Memorial Coliseum argued that the relevant
product market was stadiums offered as a venue to NFL teams. 47 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit explored this definition of the product
market, but found that the sports market was very complex.' 48 Instead
of exploring the complexities of the market by looking at sub-markets
and reactions to a price increase, the court merely accepted the jury's
finding that NFL football was the product market because of the
143. However it might deter borderline sports fans, season ticket holders that might
not be able to afford the price increase, and companies buying luxury boxes who might be
able to turn to other arenas to entertain clients and employees. Why else would teams
advertise lower ticket prices to induce more fans to come to the games?
144. 358 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1959).
145. This case involved the potential relocation of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa
Bay and the MLB's alleged interference with the move. While the MLB has normally
been exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the court found that the antitrust exemption did not
apply to the relocation issue at hand.
146. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 429-431 (D. Pa. 1993); see also
Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports
Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245 (2000).
147. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d. at 1393.
148. Id. at 1394.
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harm to competition caused by Rule 4.3 and then moved on to the
rule of reason inquiry. 149 If a SSNIP test analysis were used, a modern
day case with the same facts as Raiders I could not simply brush over
the product market analysis. As a matter of fact, the SSNIP test forces
a more extensive look at the market and sub-markets in order for a
court to implement the test successfully.
IV. Conclusion
Raiders I was decided over 20 years ago. While Raiders I has not
been overruled directly, the Supreme Court has overruled major
aspects of its analysis through other precedents in antitrust law.
Because of these new developments, Raiders I is not a good candidate
for blind reliance as precedent without incorporating the modern
antitrust concepts discussed above. Raiders I is out of date and should
not control our beliefs about the antitrust nature of sports league
franchise relocation rules.
Leagues are hesitant to formulate strict franchise relocation rules
in the face of the threat of treble damages.' My aim in writing this
note, however, is to introduce new factors that should be taken into
consideration by those sports leagues contemplating a change in their
franchise relocation rules. One approach, for example, could be to
encourage a more extensive market analysis by these leagues using
the SSNIP test, especially in the area of advertising sales. The SSNIP
test seems to be a potentially beneficial market definition for a sports
league in light of all the money involved in modern sports leagues and
all the alternatives available to fans, advertisers, and other clients of
the sports league. Further, CDA is of great benefit to a sports league
that has been subject to a "quick look" approach in the past. It not
only teaches a more extensive market analysis on the part of the
plaintiff, it also teaches what pro-competitive justifications (i.e.,
benefit to the consumer) are valid considerations in evaluating
whether or not the plaintiff presented its case.
Obviously, there are lots of factors involved in sports franchise
relocation decisions. My only hope is that these new precedents could
embolden sports leagues to come up with stricter franchise relocation
rules aimed at benefiting the hometown fan, such as myself.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 32.
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